Freeman’s
Ford
22
August 1862
The Battle at Freeman’s Ford was anything but pretty for the 74th. Less than two month’s after Cross Keys, fate
would have it that the First German would happen across the Confederate
Army. The Union Army had taken up a
position across the Rappahannock knowing that the Confederate Army was
somewhere on the other side looking for a place to ford what at the start of
the battle was a rather low, slow flowing, muddy river. The 74th was ordered to undertake
a reconnaissance, per the order of Gen. Schurz who accompanied the 74th, in the effort to find Con. Gen. Jackson’s
corps.
From their positions here, the 74th left the rest of
Gen. Bolen’s First Brigade[1]
and moved across the river, up the steep river bank, across the small stretch
of flat lands and then up the rather steep, tree covered hillside. The climb was slow and the undergrowth still
thick, but brittle from the Summer heat.
The 74th was ordered to take up a skirmishing position in
advance of the rest of their Union Brigade.
These pictures were taken
at the top of the river bank on the Union side of the Rappahannock in May – by August
the greens would be a bit more mutted and the River not as high on the banks –
or at least that was the case in 1862.
It was a hot and muggy day – and the men of the 74th
had only recently had their first engagement at Cross Keys. There was still a level of animosity between
the Officers of the 74th as well – with some showing loyalty to Lt.
Col. Hamm as a result of his “interim command” during Schimmelfennig’s recovery
and others to Colonel Schimmelfennig himself.
As the 74th came up over the ridgeline, they
encountered a few Confederate pickets just inside the tree line seen in the
picture below. The pickets were out
protecting the ambulances, supply teams, and Confederate stragglers. These men were part of the Con. Gen.
Trimble’s brigade and were actually traveling on this road. The 74th had put out a skirmish
line that was so wide, about a mile in length, it gave the impression to the
Confederates that this was the advance of a much larger force than just a
single Union brigade. However, what the
74th thought was a just a small regiment, ended up being the rear
portion of a Confederate column on the march.
This picture, with the cow standing guard, is the location of
the right wing of the 74th.
The 74th, thinking it had encountered a lone Confederate
regiment, pressed into the field and drove the Confederate pickets into an
“open field” about one mile above “Bessie’s” brown head in the picture
above. At the time of the battle, that
open field (not where we are standing in this picture but about a mile behind
Bessie) was a corn field and here Pennsylvania men fought rebels from Texas
(Hood’s Texas Brigade). What the
skirmishers of the 74th engaged was not a group of stragglers but
five regiments of Confederate soldiers.
Schimmelfennig quickly realized that what he had walked out into
was a gap between two wings of the Confederate Army (the rear of Jackson’s
Corps with its ambulances and the advance of Longstreet’s Corps entering into
the cornfield) Within minutes, the 74th,
the 8th West Virginia, and the 61st Ohio found itself in
a defensive position as a portion of the Confederate column turned itself
around and upon the probing Union regiments.
Con. Gen. Trimble’s men hit the 8th (West) Virginia, who were
seen as traitors by the attacking Confederate soldiers – and the attack that
followed was swift, fierce and vicious.
The 8th (West) Virginia folded and was routed from the
field. As that regiment folded, Gen.
Schurz personally rallied the 61st Ohio long enough to allow the 74th
to go from skirmishing positions to that of a formed regiment. A long fighting retreat began with the 74th
and 61st working in tandem as they moved back to the river.
Seriously outnumbered, Schimmelfenning ordered the men to
undertake a bayonet charge while at the same time moving his men in such a way
as to give the impression to the advancing Confederates that more men were
coming to the Union commander’s aide.
The use of drums, bugles, shouts, and noise helped to add to the
confusion. The combined tactics bought
Schimmelfenning the much needed pause in the Confederate attack to get the
regiments back to the river.
The 74th and 61st retreated “at a greatly
increased pace” (according to Gen. Schurz) down the hill. Many of the officers were riding their horses
and as they retreated those horses became casualities of the engagement. Per the orders of Gen. Siegel, the Union
artillery pieces of three Union batteries began firing to provide some cover to
the retreating regiments. The
Confederate’s began a slow, systemic push into the wooded area with its men to
the edge of the tree line at the top of the hill. . As the men of the 74th and 61st
scrambled down the wooded hillside, those in the front of the retreat came onto
the flat at the base of the hill only to realize that the river had risen quite
a bit since their earlier crossing at noon.
Rains earlier in the day had risen the river substantially in less than
four hours and the river was no longer waist high – but rather at shoulder
height. While a firing duel began
between the Confederate forces now at the tree line at the crest of the hill
and the Union artillery forces across the river, the men of the 74th
and 61st scrambled into the river – whose current was now much
swifter.
Exposed and in the open, the retreating members of the 74th
and 61st endured constant fire.
The river bank below their own artillery was now slick, steep and muddy
allowing the Confederate attackers to play havoc upon the retreating men.
General Bohlen was killed in this part of the engagement across
from the Union artillery lines. Witness
accounts indicated that the General had been shot through the heart while he
tried to rally his troops to make the river crossing. He fell into the river and his body was
latter found as an “unidentified Colonel” by the Confederate troops.
From the ranks of the 74th, twelve men died at
Freeman’s Ford, 37 were wounded, three were reported as drowned, and 16 were
reported as missing (two of which were captured by Confederates, the rest
probably drowned). The 61st
Ohio had casualties in the neighborhood of 100 men, but due to a massive level
of disorganization within the ranks of its officers, it reported only five
casualties. This would become the basis
for the purge of officers of the Brigade noted elsewhere within the
website. For many in the 74th,
surviving the engagement at Freeman’s Ford was something akin to a military
victory – for they were nearly surrounded and taken en mass.
No marker exists near this location that tells of the battle and
the loss of U.S. Brig. General Henry Bohlen[2]. The 74th descendants are
discussing efforts to rectify that oversight.
