(Note: Text in black is what our text excerpted; blue text is the rest of part I.)
THE WRITINGS
OF
THOMAS PAINE
COLLECTED AND EDITED BY
MONCURE DANIEL CONWAY
VOLUME I.
1774 - 1779
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XIX.
THE AMERICAN CRISIS
Table of Contents
Editor's Preface
The Crisis No. I
The Crisis No. II - To Lord Howe
The Crisis No. III
The Crisis No. IV
The Crisis No. V - To General Sir William Howe
- To The Inhabitants Of
The Crisis No. VI - To The Earl Of
William Eden, ESQ., British Commissioners At
The Crisis No. VII -
To The People Of
The Crisis No. VIII - Addressed To The People Of
The Crisis No. IX - The Crisis Extraordinary - On the Subject
of Taxation
The Crisis No. X -
On The King Of
- To The People Of
The Crisis No. XI -
On The
- A Supernumerary Crisis (To Sir Guy Carleton.)
The Crisis No. XII - To The Earl Of Shelburne
The Crisis No. XIII - On The Peace, And The Probable Advantages
Thereof
A Supernumerary Crisis - (To The People Of
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THE AMERICAN CRISIS.
EDITOR'S PREFACE.
THOMAS PAINE, in his Will, speaks of this work as The American
Crisis, remembering perhaps that a number of political pamphlets had
appeared in
By the blunder of an early English publisher of Paine's writings, one
essay in the
has continued to cause confusion. This publisher was D. I. Eaton, who
printed as the first number of Paine's " Crisis " an essay taken from
the
printing of this book, the publisher is informed that No. 1, or first
Crisis in this publication, is not one of the thirteen which Paine
wrote, but a letter previous to them." Unfortunately this correction
is sufficiently equivocal to leave on some minds the notion that
Paine did write the letter in question, albeit not as a number of his
" Crisis " ; especially as Eaton's editor unwarrantably appended the
signature " C. S.," suggesting " Common Sense." There are, however,
no such letters in the
published August , 1775, in the form of a letter to General Gage, in
answer to his Proclamation
concerning the affair at
certainly not written by Paine. It apologizes for the Americans for
having, on April I9, at
troops from behind walls and lurking holes." The writer asks : " Have
not the Americans been driven to this frenzy? Is it not common for an
enemy to take every advantage ?
" Paine, who was in
affair occurred at
story as a falsehood, but the facts
known to every one in
were as yet not before the
bears evidence throughout of having
been written in
derived nothing from Paine, and he derived nothing from it, unless
its title, and this is too obvious for its origin to require
discussion. I have no doubt, however, that the title was suggested by
the English publication, because Paine has followed its scheme in
introducing a " Crisis Extraordinary." His work consists of thirteen
numbers, and, in addition to these, a " Crisis Extraordinary "and a "
Supernumerary Crisis." In some modern collections all of these have
been serially numbered, and a brief newspaper article added, making
sixteen numbers. But Paine, in his Will, speaks of the number as
thirteen, wishing perhaps, in his characteristic way, to adhere to
the number of the American Colonies, as he did in the thirteen ribs
of his iron bridge. His enumeration is therefore followed in the
present volume, and the numbers printed successively, although other
writings intervened.
The first " Crisis " was
printed in the Pennsylvania Journal,
the times that try men's souls"; the last " Crisis "appeared April
19,1783, (eighth anniversary of the
first gun of the war, at
souls are over." The great effect produced by Paine's successive
publications has been attested by Washington and Franklin, by every
leader of the American Revolution, by resolutions of Congress, and by
every contemporary historian of the events amid which they were
written. The first " Crisis " is of especial historical interest. It
was written during the retreat of
by order of the Commander was read to groups of his dispirited and
suffering soldiers. Its opening sentence was adopted as the watchword
of the movement on
believed to have inspired much of the courage which won that victory,
which, though not imposing in
extent, was of great moral effect on
THE CRISIS
I.
THESE are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the
sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of
their country; but he that stands it now, deserves the love and
thanks of man and woman. Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered;
yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict,
the more glorious the triumph. What we obtain too cheap, we esteem
too lightly: it is dearness only that gives every thing its value.
Heaven knows how to put a proper price upon its goods; and it would
be strange indeed if so celestial an article as FREEDOM should not be
highly rated. Britain, with an army to enforce her tyranny, has
declared that she has a right (not only to TAX) but "to BIND us in
ALL CASES WHATSOEVER," and if being bound in that manner, is not
slavery, then is there not such a thing as slavery upon earth. Even
the expression is impious; for so unlimited a power can belong only
to God.
Whether
the independence of the continent was declared too soon, or
delayed
too long, I will not now enter into as an argument; my own
simple
opinion is, that had it been eight months earlier, it would
have been
much better. We did not make a proper use of last winter,
neither
could we, while we were in a dependent state. However, the
fault, if
it were one, was all our own*; we have none to blame but
ourselves.
But no great deal is lost yet. All that Howe has been
doing for
this month past, is rather a ravage than a conquest, which
the spirit
of the
and which
time and a little resolution will soon recover.
* The
present winter is worth an age, if rightly employed; but, if
lost or
neglected, the whole continent will partake of the evil; and
there is
no punishment that man does not deserve, be he who, or what,
or where
he will, that may be the means of sacrificing a season so
precious
and useful.
I have as little superstition in me as any man living, but my secret
opinion has ever been, and still is, that God Almighty will not give
up a people to military destruction, or leave them unsupportedly to
perish, who have so earnestly and so repeatedly sought to avoid the
calamities of war, by every decent method which wisdom could invent.
Neither have I so much of the infidel in me, as to suppose that He
has relinquished the government of the world, and given us up to the
care of devils; and as I do not, I cannot see on what grounds the
king of
murderer, a highwayman, or a house-breaker, has as good a pretence as
he.
'Tis
surprising to see how rapidly a panic will sometimes run through
a country.
All nations and ages have been subject to them.
has
trembled like an ague at the report of a French fleet of
flat-bottomed
boats; and in the fourteenth [fifteenth] century the
whole
English army, after ravaging the
back like
men petrified with fear; and this brave exploit was
performed
by a few broken forces collected and headed by a woman,
Joan of
Arc. Would that heaven might inspire some
spirit up
her countrymen, and save her fair fellow sufferers from
ravage and
ravishment! Yet panics, in some cases, have their uses;
they
produce as much good as hurt. Their duration is always short;
the mind
soon grows through them, and acquires a firmer habit than
before.
But their peculiar advantage is, that they are the
touchstones
of sincerity and hypocrisy, and bring things and men to
light,
which might otherwise have lain forever undiscovered. In fact,
they have
the same effect on secret traitors, which an imaginary
apparition
would have upon a private murderer. They sift out the
hidden
thoughts of man, and hold them up in public to the world. Many
a
disguised Tory has lately shown his head, that shall penitentially
solemnize
with curses the day on which Howe arrived upon the
As I was
with the troops at
edge of
which
those who live at a distance know but little or nothing of. Our
situation
there was exceedingly cramped, the place being a narrow
neck of
land between the
was
inconsiderable, being not one-fourth so great as Howe could bring
against
us. We had no army at hand to have relieved the garrison, had
we shut
ourselves up and stood on our defence. Our ammunition, light
artillery,
and the best part of our stores, had been removed, on the
apprehension
that Howe would endeavor to penetrate the
which case
every
thinking man, whether in the army or not, that these kind of
field
forts are only for temporary purposes, and last in use no
longer
than the enemy directs his force against the particular object
which such
forts are raised to defend. Such was our situation and
condition
at
officer
arrived with information that the enemy with 200 boats had
landed
about seven miles above; Major General [Nathaniel] Green, who
commanded
the garrison, immediately ordered them under arms, and sent
express to
General Washington at the town of
the way of
the ferry = six miles. Our first object was to secure the
bridge
over the
and us,
about six miles from us, and three from them. General
the head
of the troops towards the bridge, which place I expected we
should
have a brush for; however, they did not choose to dispute it
with us,
and the greatest part of our troops went over the bridge,
the rest
over the ferry, except some which passed at a mill on a
small
creek, between the bridge and the ferry, and made their way
through
some marshy grounds up to the town of
passed the
river. We brought off as much baggage as the wagons could
contain,
the rest was lost. The simple object was to bring off the
garrison,
and march them on till they could be strengthened by the
We staid
four days at
the
informed
that they were advancing, though our numbers were greatly
inferior
to theirs. Howe, in my little opinion, committed a great
error in
generalship in not throwing a body of forces off from Staten
Island
through Amboy, by which means he might have seized all our
stores at
if we
believe the power of hell to be limited, we must likewise
believe
that their agents are under some providential control.
I shall
not now attempt to give all the particulars of our retreat to
the
and men,
though greatly harassed and fatigued, frequently without
rest,
covering, or provision, the inevitable consequences of a long
retreat,
bore it with a manly and martial spirit. All their wishes
centred in
one, which was, that the country would turn out and help
them to
drive the enemy back. Voltaire has remarked that King William
never
appeared to full advantage but in difficulties and in action;
the same
remark may be made on General Washington, for the character
fits him.
There is a natural firmness in some minds which cannot be
unlocked
by trifles, but which, when unlocked, discovers a cabinet of
fortitude;
and I reckon it among those kind of public blessings,
which we
do not immediately see, that God hath blessed him with
uninterrupted
health, and given him a mind that can even flourish
upon care.
I shall
conclude this paper with some miscellaneous remarks on the
state of
our affairs; and shall begin with asking the following
question,
Why is it that the enemy have left the
provinces,
and made these middle ones the seat of war? The answer is
easy:
been
tender in raising the cry against these men, and used numberless
arguments
to show them their danger, but it will not do to sacrifice
a world
either to their folly or their baseness. The period is now
arrived,
in which either they or we must change our sentiments, or
one or
both must fall. And what is a Tory? Good God! what is he? I
should not
be afraid to go with a hundred Whigs against a thousand
Tories,
were they to attempt to get into arms. Every Tory is a
coward;
for servile, slavish, self-interested fear is the foundation
of
Toryism; and a man under such influence, though he may be cruel,
never can
be brave.
But,
before the line of irrecoverable separation be drawn between us,
let us
reason the matter together: Your conduct is an invitation to
the enemy,
yet not one in a thousand of you has heart enough to join
him. Howe
is as much deceived by you as the American cause is injured
by you. He
expects you will all take up arms, and flock to his
standard,
with muskets on your shoulders. Your opinions are of no use
to him,
unless you support him personally, for 'tis soldiers, and not
Tories,
that he wants.
I once felt all that kind of anger, which a man ought to feel,
against the mean principles that are held by the Tories: a noted one,
who kept a tavern at Amboy, was standing at his door, with as pretty
a child in his hand, about eight or nine years old, as I ever saw,
and after speaking his mind as freely as he thought was prudent,
finished with this unfatherly expression, "Well! give me peace in
my
day." Not a man lives on the continent but fully believes that a
separation must some time or other finally take place, and a generous
parent should have said, "If there must be trouble, let it be in
my
day, that my child may have peace;" and this single reflection,
well
applied, is sufficient to awaken every man to duty. Not a place upon
earth might be so happy as
the wrangling world, and she has nothing to do but to trade with
them. A man can distinguish himself between temper and principle, and
I am as confident, as I am that God governs the world, that America
will never be happy till she gets clear of foreign dominion. Wars,
without ceasing, will break out till that period arrives, and the
continent must in the end be conqueror; for though the flame of
liberty may sometimes cease to shine, the coal can never expire.
application
of that force. Wisdom is not the purchase of a day, and
it is no
wonder that we should err at the first setting off. From an
excess of
tenderness, we were unwilling to raise an army, and trusted
our cause
to the temporary defence of a well-meaning militia. A
summer's
experience has now taught us better; yet with those troops,
while they
were collected, we were able to set bounds to the progress
of the
enemy, and, thank God! they are again assembling. I always
considered
militia as the best troops in the world for a sudden
exertion,
but they will not do for a long campaign. Howe, it is
probable,
will make an attempt on this city [
fail on
this side the
cause is
not ruined. He stakes all on his side against a part on
ours;
admitting he succeeds, the consequence will be, that armies
from both
ends of the continent will march to assist their suffering
friends in
the middle states; for he cannot go everywhere, it is
impossible.
I consider Howe as the greatest enemy the Tories have; he
is
bringing a war into their country, which, had it not been for him
and partly
for themselves, they had been clear of. Should he now be
expelled,
I wish with all the devotion of a Christian, that the names
of Whig
and Tory may never more be mentioned; but should the Tories
give him
encouragement to come, or assistance if he come, I as
sincerely
wish that our next year's arms may expel them from the
continent,
and the Congress appropriate their possessions to the
relief of
those who have suffered in well-doing. A single successful
battle
next year will settle the whole.
years' war
by the confiscation of the property of disaffected
persons,
and be made happy by their expulsion. Say not that this is
revenge,
call it rather the soft resentment of a suffering people,
who,
having no object in view but the good of all, have staked their
own all
upon a seemingly doubtful event. Yet it is folly to argue
against
determined hardness; eloquence may strike the ear, and the
language
of sorrow draw forth the tear of compassion, but nothing can
reach the
heart that is steeled with prejudice.
Quitting
this class of men, I turn with
the warm ardor of a friend to
those who have nobly stood, and are yet determined to stand the
matter out: I call not upon a few, but upon all: not on this state or
that state, but on every state: up and help us; lay your shoulders to
the wheel; better have too much force than too little, when so great
an object is at stake. Let it be told to the future world, that in
the depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive,
that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came
forth to meet and to repulse it. Say not that thousands are gone,
turn out your tens of thousands; throw not the burden of the day upon
you. It matters not where you live, or what rank of life you hold,
the evil or the blessing will reach you all. The far and the near,
the home counties and the back, the rich and the poor, will suffer or
rejoice alike. The heart that feels not now is dead; the blood of his
children will curse his cowardice, who shrinks back at a time when a
little might have saved the whole, and made them happy. I love the
man that can smile in trouble, that can gather strength from
distress, and grow brave by reflection. 'Tis the business of little
minds to shrink; but he whose heart is firm, and whose conscience
approves his conduct, will pursue his principles unto death. My own
line of reasoning is to myself as straight and clear as a ray of
light. Not all the treasures of the world, so far as I believe, could
have induced me to support an offensive war, for I think it murder;
but if a thief breaks into my house, burns and destroys my property,
and kills or threatens to kill me, or those that are in it, and to
"bind me in all cases whatsoever" to his absolute will, am I
to
suffer it? What signifies it to me, whether he who does it is a king
or a common man; my countryman or not my countryman; whether it be
done by an individual villain, or an army of them? If we reason to
the root of things we shall find no difference; neither can any just
cause be assigned why we should punish in the one case and pardon in
the other. Let them call me rebel and
welcome, I feel no concern from
it; but I
should suffer the misery of devils, were I to make a whore
of my soul
by swearing allegiance to one whose character is that of a
sottish,
stupid, stubborn, worthless, brutish man. I conceive
likewise a
horrid idea in receiving mercy from a being, who at the
last day
shall be shrieking to the rocks and mountains to cover him,
and
fleeing with terror from the orphan, the widow, and the slain of
There are
cases which cannot be overdone by language, and this is
one. There
are persons, too, who see not the full extent of the evil
which
threatens them; they solace themselves with hopes that the
enemy, if
he succeed, will be merciful. It is the madness of folly,
to expect
mercy from those who have refused to do justice; and even
mercy,
where conquest is the object, is only a trick of war; the
cunning of
the fox is as murderous as the violence of the wolf, and
we ought
to guard equally against both. Howe's first object is,
partly by
threats and partly by promises, to terrify or seduce the
people to
deliver up their arms and receive mercy. The ministry
recommended
the same plan to Gage, and this is what the tories call
making
their peace, "a peace which passeth all understanding" indeed!
A peace
which would be the immediate forerunner of a worse ruin than
any we
have yet thought of. Ye men of
these
things! Were the back counties to give up their arms, they
would fall
an easy prey to the Indians, who are all armed: this
perhaps is
what some Tories would not be sorry for. Were the home
counties
to deliver up their arms, they would be exposed to the
resentment
of the back counties who would then have it in their power
to
chastise their defection at pleasure. And were any one state to
give up
its arms, that state must be garrisoned by all Howe's army of
Britons
and Hessians to preserve it from the anger of the rest.
Mutual
fear is the principal link in the chain of mutual love, and
woe be to
that state that breaks the compact. Howe is mercifully
inviting
you to barbarous destruction, and men must be either rogues
or fools
that will not see it. I dwell not upon the vapors of
imagination;
I bring reason to your ears, and, in language as plain
as A, B,
C, hold up truth to your eyes.
I thank
God, that I fear not. I see no real cause for fear. I know
our
situation well, and can see the way out of it. While our army was
collected,
Howe dared not risk a battle; and it is no credit to him
that he
decamped from the
to ravage
the defenceless
that, with
a handful of men, we sustained an orderly retreat for near
an hundred
miles, brought off our ammunition, all our field pieces,
the
greatest part of our stores, and had four rivers to pass. None
can say
that our retreat was precipitate, for we were near three
weeks in
performing it, that the country might have time to come in.
Twice we
marched back to meet the enemy, and remained out till dark.
The sign
of fear was not seen in our camp, and had not some of the
cowardly
and disaffected inhabitants spread false alarms through the
country,
the
collected
and collecting; our new army at both ends of the continent
is
recruiting fast, and we shall be able to open the next campaign
with sixty
thousand men, well armed and clothed. This is our
situation,
and who will may know it. By perseverance and fortitude we
have the
prospect of a glorious issue; by cowardice and submission,
the sad
choice of a variety of evils- a ravaged country- a
depopulated
city- habitations without safety, and slavery without
hope- our
homes turned into barracks and bawdy-houses for Hessians,
and a
future race to provide for, whose fathers we shall doubt of.
Look on
this picture and weep over it! and if there yet remains one
thoughtless
wretch who believes it not, let him suffer it unlamented.
COMMON
SENSE.